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Abstract  
In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis (GFC) stock markets experienced sharp 
decline in listings and marked reduction in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). This paper explores 
the factors determining UK technology based small firm (TBSF) listings on the UK Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) and whether this market has a role to play in their future 
development. 
 
A case study approach is used to contrast the experiences of five recent AIM listed TBSFs 
with five TBSFs approaching private equity investment exit that are considering an IPO.  
 
The paper concludes that macro market conditions, rather than managerial resource base or 
AIM market structural factors were most influential in TBSF pecking order preferences to 
undertake IPOs. From a resource based management perspective lifelong entrepreneurs 
were more likely than serial entrepreneurs to favour an IPO exit, as it supported their aims to 
continue to manage and grow UK-based companies. Additionally, with a more buoyant and 
sustainable AIM market TBSF investors are more likely to choose IPOs. To conclude, AIM 
played an important role in listed UK TBSF development. A more buoyant AIM could ease the 
UK finance escalator’s flow, facilitating more rapid UK TBSF growth.   
Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007, resultant slump in investor 
confidence, and sharp decline in listings on UK stock markets, this paper explores the 
perceptions and motivations of UK technology based small firms (TBSFs) in considering and 
undertaking Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) and listing on the UK Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM), since 2007. In doing so it raises and addresses the important question of whether AIM 
has a crucial role to play in the future growth and development of UK TBSFs. 
 
The study is based on in depth case studies contrasting five recent listings with five potential 
IPOs. These are used to test the resource based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney 1991) and 
consider the extent to which this has influence over the entrepreneur’s pecking order 
preferences (Myers and Majluf 1984) and decisions for private equity exit and listing, within 
the early stage cycle of the firm (Berger and Udel, 1998). In making this assessment three 
potentially influential factors are considered: (i) management resource base factors, reflecting 
changing management pecking order preferences; (ii) macro economic factors relating to the 
GFC, resultant loss of investor confidence and emerging alternative sources of finance; or (iii) 
structural problems in the market’s operation such as cost, regulatory demands and short-
termism.  
 
The importance of ensuring a smooth and sufficient supply of appropriate external finance to 
UK TBSFs appears to be a crucial issue. NESTA’s (2009) ‘Vital 6%’ research found that over 
half of all employment in the UK between 2002-08 was created by just six per cent of 
businesses. This suggests that a relatively small band of innovative high growth TBSFs could 
form an important part of this driver in the recovery and growth of the UK economy (NESTA 
2010). Recent research (North, Baldock and Ullah 2013) focusing on UK TBSF financing 
constraints in the post GFC era has seen growing attention given to the perceived growth in 
the equity finance gap (Rowlands 2009; SQW 2009) and the failings of the UK finance 
escalator (Mason, Jones and Wells 2010; Gill 2010) mapping the Burger and Udell (1998) life 
cycle model to the smooth financial transition through the stages of research and 
development (R&D) growth. Whilst Fraser, Bhaumik and Wright (2013) mention the generally 
weak performance of second tier feeder IPO markets in Europe in raising SME growth capital, 
there has been relatively little attention given to the role of the public equity markets in the 
UK, particularly in relation to the AIM feeder market and the TBSF user perspective (Mason, 
Jones and Wells 2010).              
 
The paper proceeds with a review of the key theories underlying the issues explored, before 
setting out the research methodology, main findings, and using a decision factors matrix 
approach to draw out key conclusions. 
 
The UK Finance Escalator and Pecking Order Theory 
Business growth cycle theory (Burger and Udell 1998), which underpins the UK finance 
escalator model (NESTA 2009a; BIS 2008), suggests that as businesses grow and gain 
market traction they become less opaque to potential investors and transition to different 
types of finance as this becomes more suitable to the businesses and for their investors. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) present a pecking order theory suggesting that businesses have a 
preference for internal finance such as founder investment and reinvested surplus over 
external finance. Furthermore, they suggest that businesses have a preference for external 
debt over equity finance and dilution of ownership. Subsequent research, such as Atherton’s 
(2009) examination of UK start-up financing, has shown that pecking order is nuanced and 
may be influenced by previous entrepreneurial experience and path dependency (Teece 
2007) where preferences may be influenced or dictated by previous financing decisions, tying 
pecking order theory into the RBV business management approach explored in this paper.     
 
The decision to list on a feeder market such as AIM is a major undertaking and typically 
occurs as TBSFs approach the later stages of the cycle, reaching a point where earlier stage 
private equity investors wish to exit. These businesses typically need to raise funds to buyout 
their existing investors either via an IPO or trade sale to a larger market competitor. Trade 
sales are by far the most common exit strategy in both Europe and North America, with only a 
small minority, typically less than 20 per cent seeking an IPO (Revest and Sapio 2012; 
NESTA 2010).  
 
The development of a more effective AIM UK public equity feeder market for substantial 
TBSF growth finance is likely to be vital to the UK’s future economic recovery, providing a 
timely private equity exit option, freeing up these funds for earlier stage TBSF development, 
whilst also encouraging larger scale TBSF growth within the UK.  
 
 
Management influences, resource and knowledge factors 
 
The extent to which entrepreneurs and their firm’s management resource base (Storey 1994) 
dictates its growth and investment strategy, and whether a resource based view (RBV) in 
relation to TBSF equity finance is more influential in the pecking order selection than 
economic and structural market conditions, is central to this paper. Barney (1991) highlights 
the importance of management skills which may combine individual human and 
organisational management capital to facilitate competitive advantage. These skills may be 
gained through training, experience and relationships, providing enhanced insights and 
judgements that can lead to competitive advantage in a range of management areas such as 
sales and marketing, product and service development, operations management and, 
crucially, financial management.   
 
Aggerwal and Hsu (2013) point to four key strands of management exit decision literature: 
first, venture capitalist (VC) negotiation strengths (Hellman 2006; Cumming 2008); second, 
public market strengths (Bayar and Chemmanur 2012); third, company market position in 
relation to acquisition (Poulsen and Stegemoller 2008); and fourth, founder characteristics 
where their retained control is more associated with IPOs than trade sales. From a RBV 
perspective, the interplay between the relative VC strength, the entrepreneur and other 
management resources, including the use of external advisors and non executive directors 
(NEDs), would appear to be a vital and under researched factor.    
 
Recent debate has focused on entrepreneurial differences and business growth motivations, 
with clear distinctions between innovation driven enterprises (IDE) and other SMEs (Moretti 
2012; Aulet and Murray 2013) and between opportunity and necessity driven entrepreneurs 
(Tellegen 1997). Whilst these present a strong case for IDE entrepreneurs to seek risk equity 
finance, there is a need for more fine grained understanding of these entrepreneurs (Carsrud 
and Brannback 2011), notably in relation to their selection and use of public or private equity.   
 
The adoption of non executive directors (NEDS) with specialist skills (Barrow 2001), the 
previous experience of managers in accessing external finance, and the extent to which 
external assistance from intermediary equity market advisors, accountants and business 
support agencies is used to facilitate access to debt and equity finance appear crucial to 
financial preferences and success rates in obtaining and managing external finance (BIS 
2012 and 2013; Filatotchev 2006).  
 
Various recent studies (BIS 2010 and 2012; Mason and Kwok 2010; Gompers et al 2010; 
North, Baldock and Ullah 2013) have indicated that more experienced managers and those 
using external assistance are more likely to be successful in accessing external finance, 
particularly in relation to TBSF’s in accessing equity finance. Gompers’ (1996) ‘grandstanding’ 
theory highlights the preference for VCs to choose IPOs at times which will maximise returns 
for investors and build their reputations, whilst Hsu (2009) found that longer VC incubation 
periods prior to IPO lead to better sustainable performance post IPO and Bessler and Seim 
(2012) demonstrate the importance of post IPO presence of VCs in improving companies’ 
public market long run performance. Private equity VCs and their appointed NEDs are 
therefore highly likely to influence exit strategies.   
 
Perceptions and motivations for TBSF AIM listings and macro market conditions 
 
In examining the perceptions and motivations of UK TBSFs to list on AIM, post 2007, this 
raises the question as to whether AIM is perceived as having a viable role in financing the 
development of UK TBSFs. Whilst some commentators such as Fraser, Bhaumik and Wright 
(2013) suggest that public equity feeder markets in Europe have had a minor and declining 
role in recent years, others such as Bessler and Seim (2012) demonstrate that they have 
successfully provided access to growth capital in Europe, particularly in the mid 2000s boom 
period. With the Breedon Review (2012) estimating a UK SME finance gap of between £84bn 
and £191bn from 2012-16, it may be argued that AIM could have an increasingly important 
role to play as the UK economy recovers and grows in the next few years. A properly 
functioning public equity feeder market can provide substantial growth funding to TBSFs, 
whilst also facilitating early stage private equity exits. This can enable the recycling private 
equity back into the earlier stages of TBSF development, producing a smoother flow of the 
UK finance escalator (Mason, Jones and Wells 2010) and the more rapid development of the 
UK’s most innovative and growth oriented young businesses.  
 
A recent survey of government backed VC fund managers (CfEL 2013) supported concerns 
about breakages in the UK finance escalator. This revealed poor exit conditions resulting in 
lengthening times to exit, along with increasing difficulties in securing follow-on private equity 
finance. The result has been locked-in early stage investor funding and sub-optimal drip-feed 
underfunding for companies. Furthermore, only 3 per cent were likely to choose IPO exits due 
to their perception of poor investor confidence in the AIM market. Ernst and Young’s annual 
IPO report (2012) recognises the growth of alternative funding, for example through crowd 
equity, family office and corporate trade investments, whilst Cave (2009) highlights an 
emerging early stage pharmaceutical investment asset class. However, there is also 
recognition that a buoyant public feeder market would be highly beneficial to UK TBSF 
growth.                
.  
North, Baldock and Ullah (2013) demonstrate the importance of risk equity finance to TBSFs, 
suggesting that whilst less than two per cent of UK SMEs (1) sought equity finance in the 
period from 2007-10, a considerably higher proportion of TBSFs (23 per cent) had sought 
equity finance in this period. Whilst this may well be an overestimate, since the study focused 
on growth oriented TBSFs, a recent GFK (2013) survey of TBSFs in London’s Tech City also 
exhibited high proportional use of equity finance amongst these businesses (27 per cent had 
used angel finance and 22 per cent had used VC finance). These potentially fast growth 
TBSFs are more likely to require equity risk finance because banks are unable or unwilling to 
offer them debt finance due to their lack of trading record or collateral and the information 
asymmetries associated with the intangible value of their technical innovations (Stiglitz and 
Weiss 1981; Hsu 2004). Even fewer businesses access public equity in the form of an IPO 
(Revest and Sapio 2012), with NESTA (2010) data for US companies finding that between 
2000-09 less than one fifth of private equity backed companies had exited early stage 
investments via IPOs. Whilst IPOs therefore affect few businesses, they are 
disproportionately far more important for higher growth TBSFs, being used as a private equity 
exit route and also to raise substantial funding for R&D, business development and strategic 
acquisitions (BIS 2013).  
 
The UK’s main IPO feeder market for TBSFs is AIM (Posner 2004 and 2009). Since 
establishment in 1995, AIM has proven more robust and successful than other European 
feeder markets, with IPOs to date raising over £35bn (AIM 2013) and further issue finance 
raising £45bn towards business growth and development. However, since the 2007 GFC 
through the period of this paper’s research to early 2013 there has been a marked decline in 
IPOs on AIM (Table 1). This has ostensibly been due to the reduced level of liquidity in the 
market as equity investment levels declined rapidly in the UK during the GFC and have 
remained depressed, due to a combination of investor and prospective IPO business caution, 
underscored by a lack of high profile successful IPOs during the period of this study (Ernst 
and Young 2012).          
 
Structural problems with AIM 
 
Recent negative trends in UK stock markets are a reflection of the wider impacts of the GFC. 
The banking crisis of 2007 led to a major loss of investor confidence in stock markets across 
the globe. In the UK the main London Stock Exchange (LSE) experienced a net decline of 86 
(-14 per cent) listed companies from December 2007 to August 2011 (QCA 2011). The AIM 
feeder market with smaller, younger and potentially more risky investments, experienced a far 
greater net decline of over one third (-35.3 per cent) between 2007 and 2012 (Table 1). It is 
notable that this was more than double the decline that took place in the NASDAQ (-15.6 per 
cent), the equivalent US feeder market, over a similar period (NASDAQ, September 2013).  
AIM experienced investors’ ‘flight to quality’ (Cabellero and Krishnamurthy 2008) and 
retrenchment to established ‘blue chip’ stock (Mason, Jones and Wells 2010). These 
investment approaches are typical of ‘credit crunch’ periods and operate to the detriment of 
perceived riskier investments into the young TBSF feeder market (Holmstrom and Tirole, 
1997). However, despite the prevailing depressed investment market conditions, the 
particularly poor performance of the AIM market in this period raised concerns about its 
operation and value in assisting TBSF growth (Kay 2012; BIS 2013).  
 
The resultant Kay Review (2012) of UK stock markets explored the areas of potential failure 
in their operations. It highlighted systemic problems of market short-termism and the 
destructive impact that this can have on the development of R&D intensive businesses. The 
Kay Review’s recommendations particularly focus on the role of market intermediaries (e.g. 
brokers, analysts and asset managers). The suggestion is that their recent short term 
investment mindset, which is driven by annual bonus incentives, stimulates market volatility. 
For example, they may generate inflated investor expectation in the performance of young 
TBSFs, which are relatively fragile businesses in the market. For these businesses a single 
report of under performance can quickly deflate investor confidence with potentially 
catastrophic consequences. These structural issues became particularly acute during the 
GFC when investor confidence fell (Mason Jones and Wells 2010). The Kay Review (2012) 
therefore points to the need for a more stable investment market that could benefit both 
investors and investee companies and lead to greater confidence and use of the markets. 
Subsequently, BIS (2013) reported that whilst current AIM regulations are perceived as a 
minor barrier, the costs associated with IPOs are currently considered high in comparison to 
their potential financial benefits, a view which might change if market conditions improve. A 
prevailing view in the City (Ernst and Young 2012; New City Network 2013) is to address the 
key challenge of raising investor confidence in the face of tough macro economic conditions, 
notably through enhanced tax breaks, including the abolition of stamp duty on AIM share 
dealings in 2014 (2). A crucial question here is whether entrepreneur and VC perceptions of 
structural issues will inhibit IPO activity when macro economic confidence improves in the UK.   
 
 
Methodology 
 
The research sought insight into the perceptions and motivations for whether or not TBSFs 
seek an IPO and whether, in the post 2007 GFC period, the AIM feeder market can have an 
effective role in enabling UK TBSF growth. This required an exploratory approach using 
qualitative case studies (Eisenhardt 1989) allowing senior managers to provide full 
explanations for company decisions, revealing the varying influence and importance of 
investors and NEDs and changing perceptions of the AIM market and alternative finance 
options over time. An iterative, interpretive approach has been taken to draw out key decision 
making factors (Yin 2003). This entailed repeat interviewing work with the senior managers in 
order to gain clarity of observations and enable proposition development (Eisenhardt 1989), 
notably around the nature of founder senior manager aims and attitudes in contrast with those 
of investors,  and to reveal through a process of content analysis a consolidation of evidence 
and causal inference (Yin 2003).  
 
Contrast is provided by comparing the decisions and experiences of five AIM listed TBSFs 
that listed during the GFC period between 2007 and 2012 with five TBSFs that are currently 
using private equity and approaching the stage when the finance escalator suggests that they 
will require a late round of funding which could involve an IPO (e.g. for late stage R&D, early 
commercialisation, or strategic growth acquisition). The aim was to gain insight into potential 
sensitivities of difference, with regard to the selection of IPOs, between the two contrasting 
case sets and to explore the reasons for any revealed differences ‘…developing a theory that 
accounts for much of the relevant behaviour’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967, p.30).    
 
The business cases were initially screened and purposively selected to provide a small, but 
sufficient number to gain grounded qualitative insightful evidence (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) 
from in-depth IPO and potential IPO TBSF case studies. Selection aimed to demonstrate key 
themes and emerging issues for TBSF IPO stage finance as a whole, whilst also 
encompassing a range of sectors with varying early stage investment horizons (contrasting 
IT/digital with life science) and different management structures (involving serial and life 
entrepreneurs, investors and NEDs). All of the case studies are UK owned and based, R&D 
intensive, and developing innovative new products. The comparator groups are closely 
matched (3), with a suitable balance between life sciences, software and digital technology 
and scientific instrument development between the currently listed and potential listings 
groups (Table 2). These are the type of UK businesses which should be the embodiment of 
NESTA’s ‘Vital 6%’, with potential for rapid growth and employment generation, if they remain 
in the UK. They are representative of what Ullah, North and Baldock (2011) define as 
independently owned small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with under 250 employees 
that embrace innovative technologies in the high technology sectors defined by Bullock and 
Millner (2003) (4). North, Baldock and Ullah (2013) indicate that innovative R&D intensive 
TBSFs represent just 6 per cent of the UK business population (circa 120,000 businesses) 
(5). Whilst the selected businesses are only a small sample of these highly innovative 
businesses and cannot be considered in any way to be representative of this sector, those 
selected are: 
 
(i) Five recent TBSF IPOs on AIM that are currently listed. In context, there have 
been 310 UK company AIM admissions between 2007 and the end of 2012 of 
which around one quarter (75) have been TBSFs and not all of these post 2007 
TBSF listings have remained listed or survived in this period. The sample’s 
survival bias is noted and reflects the objective of the research in providing 
contemporary matching viewpoints of current and prospective AIM companies. 
Some contextual balance is provided by reference to an AIM delisting case from 
the BIS (2013) study.  
(ii) Five potential IPOs sampled from TBSFs successfully obtaining a mix of private 
equity finance, including business angel and government backed equity. These 
businesses were sourced from previous studies examining recent UK TBSF 
access to finance (6) and referrals through TBSF science park networks (BIS 
2010 and 2012) in order to provide relevant contemporary TBSF cases to 
interview in February 2013. In context, given that on an annual basis AIM listings 
typically represent less than one in five private equity exits, they are part of circa 
130 UK TBSFs that were considering exits at the time of the study (7).       
 
In-depth interviews were undertaken with senior managers of the TBSFs (8). Since these are 
relatively young businesses (median five years established) a majority of respondents (8/10) 
were founders, or had been involved in the business from an early stage. A topic guide 
approach was taken, covering issues relating to: the business profile (including sector and 
degree of innovative activity, establishment/trading age and confirmation of position within the 
growth finance cycle), ownership structure, size by employment and sales turnover; 
performance (employment, sales turnover and asset value), growth aspirations and 
projections; access to finance issues and requirements; reasons for undertaking a UK AIM 
listing; board structures and the roles of NEDs, experience or perceptions of undertaking and 
managing a listing; suggestions for changes to improve the operation of the AIM market. The 
interviews were mainly carried out face to face at the business premises (three in each 
category) with the remainder undertaken by extended telephone interview (enabling greater 
regional coverage) and also included follow up telephone interviews in Spring 2013. 
Interviews were fully transcribed and supplemented by email exchanges and company 
website and reporting documentary research evidence for further detail and accuracy.     
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
 
 
Characteristics of TBSF cases  
 
A range of digital and life science TBSFs are included in both the AIM listed and potential IPO 
groups (Table 2), with the listed companies exhibiting a slightly older trading age profile, 
typically conforming to the finance escalator model (Gill 2010). A notable exception is a listed 
gene therapy business which, after 18 years, is nearing the introduction of its products to the 
market and exemplifies the long lead times required for life science R&D (Rowlands 2009; 
SQW 2009). All are highly, mostly globally, innovative businesses and largely export driven, 
particularly to advanced markets in North America and Europe, but also to emerging markets 
in India, China and South Africa. The minority of surveyed businesses trading predominantly 
in the UK are operating in the niche green energy and transport infrastructure market sectors.  
 
It is notable that the management structures (Table 2) of the listed and potential listing 
companies are quite similar, with the private equity companies already having sizeable 
boards containing between six and 12 senior managers and between two and six NEDs. 
Indeed, some of the private equity companies have larger boards and greater NED presence 
than their listed counterparts (which contained between four and six board members and 
between two and three NEDs). The larger boards in the private equity companies reflected 
their numbers of private investors. For example, the life science company with the largest 
board and NED presence had undertaken multiple rounds of fundraising involving several 
private and government backed VCs and high net worth individual investors. These 
companies therefore exhibited well established financial and corporate governance practices, 
instilled by their investors, and appeared well prepared for IPOs in this respect.         
 
The surveyed senior managers exhibited different attitudes and visions relating to their roles 
and aims for the companies and these emergent attitudes are captured in the developing 
classification of CEOs presented in Table 2. This builds on IDE entrepreneur characteristics 
(Moretti 2012; Aulet and Murray 2013) in establishing a more nuanced approach suggested 
by Carsrud and Brannback (2011). These have been characterised as: (i) serial 
entrepreneurs who are primarily interested in developing the business to a stage where they 
will then be content to sell-out and start on a new business venture (one listed case and two 
potential IPO cases); (ii) lifelong entrepreneurs who expressed a strong vision for the longer 
term development of the company and a desire to remain in the management of the company 
over a longer term period (two listed cases and one potential IPO case); (iii) possible lifelong 
entrepreneurs who showed a desire to remain in the management of the business in the 
longer term, but who were pragmatic in their recognition that their investors might prefer to 
exit via a trade sale which might lead to them having to leave the company (two potential IPO 
cases). Additionally, two listed cases have undergone management changes where the 
original CEO is no longer with the company.      
 
The aspirational quotation presented below, from the CEO of a prospective life science 
company IPO, presents the strongest example of a lifelong entrepreneur in this study:  
 
I have been very inspired by other local Cambridge businesses that have grown and remained 
independent UK owned businesses like Oval Medical and Bluegnome. ABCAM is an example of 
a Cambridge biotech that has successfully gone all the way through the process [IPO] and has 
been successfully listed for several years, acquiring three companies in the last year. This is the 
type of growth model that I would like to be associated with in the longer term.  
 
(Insert Table 3)  
 
An important difference between the AIM listed and potential IPO cases is that, whilst all of 
the trading businesses are growth orientated and have experienced sales turnover growth, 
employment and total asset value growth in recent years (Table 3), some of the listed 
businesses have reached a growth plateau, whilst the private equity backed companies are 
forecasting rapid growth during the next couple of years. The listed businesses in plateau 
referred to seeking ‘organic growth’ and a period of relative stability after recent growth 
phases from new product marketing. They largely conform to Aggerwal and Hsu’s (2013) 
finding that post IPO businesses are less innovative (in terms of patent counts) than their 
private equity counterparts. However, this may be seen as part of the innovation cycle. For 
example, a digital imaging company planned re-investing existing surplus into further R&D, 
but with the possibility that a strategic acquisition could spark further growth: 
 
We have been going through a recent phase of operations and R&D investment, but see future 
growth potential through further strategic acquisitions to the four undertaken in recent years. 
These will complement our technological developments and strengthen our position in the 
market.    
 
The major exception amongst the surveyed listed companies is the microchip scientific 
instrument company which is on the cusp of a major marketing breakthrough, where the 
development of original equipment manufacturer (OEM) licensing agreements with key 
complementary IT suppliers globally could lead to huge sales growth opportunities.   
 
Whilst the exceedingly positive forecasts of the private equity backed potential IPOs for 
doubling their sales turnover and appreciably increasing employment (by between 15 and 50 
staff in each case) during the next couple of years are likely to be over optimistic (BIS 2012 
and 2013), Table 3 demonstrates that most of these businesses have exhibited a doubling in 
sales turnover during the previous couple of years (median increase of £6.6m) and exhibit 
impressive track records of growth in employment (median increase of 5 staff) and assets 
(median increase of £2m).  
 
A crucial factor in the growth models of these businesses is the combination of decision 
factors which determine management preferences for IPOs, trade sales or other options at 
the time when TBSFs move from early stage to later, growth stage finance when private 
equity exit might be anticipated (Aggerwal and Hsu 2013). In this paper the focus is on 
whether management factors (the management RBV) have primacy over macro economic or 
structural public market factors in the decisions that are made.      
 
 
 
 
Motivations and Factors determining AIM Listings 
 
The decision to undertake an IPO may be heavily influenced by managerial factors such as 
founder entrepreneurs’ growth aims (Moretti 2012), the management team’s resource base 
(Amini, Keasey and Hudson 2012; BIS 2013) relating to knowledge, previous experiences 
and preferences in using private and public equity and that of their private equity backers, non 
executive directors and external advisors (Hellman 2006; Cumming 2008). From the 
perspective of macro economic conditions the breakages in the finance escalator (North, 
Baldock and Ullah 2013) would be expected  to lead on the one hand to a lengthening of time 
to IPO exit (NESTA 2010) and on the other hand examples of earlier stage IPOs, substituting 
public equity for a lack of available private equity. Structural factors affecting the AIM feeder 
market such as illiquidity, costs of initial flotation and maintaining a listing, and short-term 
volatility, are also potential determinants. The remainder of the paper investigates these three 
key decision factors, contrasting five recent IPOs with five potential IPOs.  
 
AIM companies 
 
The five post 2007 listed business cases demonstrate the value of AIM to viable growth 
oriented TBSFs, even in a depressed market. AIM was their preferred IPO market primarily 
because they are UK owned and based, but also because their managers and NEDs knew 
the market. In several cases these managers had previous experience of undertaking an AIM 
IPO with another business and understood its value to TBSF development (Gompers et al., 
2010). Their choice of AIM mainly related to reputation, reliability, cost and previous 
knowledge, as summarised by one of the surveyed senior managers: 
 
From my own previous experience, and that of one of our non execs, we know exactly what we 
are getting with AIM. The market has a good reputation and this reflects well on its businesses. 
The costs and requirements are clear, it is light touch and relatively inexpensive.    
 
AIM was also the most suitable early stage public feeder market. The one company that had 
considered an overseas IPO market, the US NASDAQ, recognised:  
 
We were too small, with a market cap of under £10m, to be of any consequence and to get noticed. 
Even if we were a larger cap, success in the US market would require far greater presence in the 
US than we were prepared to undertake.   
 
As expected from the finance escalator model (Berger and Udell, 1998) raising funding for 
R&D (3 cases) and strategic acquisitions (2 cases) were the most frequently mentioned 
reasons, with TBSFs entering AIM to raise funding for relatively costly later stage R&D and 
market development. Strategic acquisitions of complementary R&D companies assisted in 
more rapid and effective development of innovative niche market activities and new 
applications of technology platforms which could facilitate entry into new markets:      
 
Our company has adopted a strategy centred on strengthening its scientific imaging technology 
portfolio. This has required actively pursuing a growth strategy designed to acquire other small 
high-technology companies in the scientific digital imaging market. 
 
Surprisingly, only one business raised AIM finance for private equity exit, as predicted in the 
finance escalator (Mason, Jones and Wells 2010). Rather, several recent listings sought 
substantial funding at an earlier development cycle stage than the model predicts, because 
no other source of suitable external finance (debt or private equity) was available. For these 
companies, as one CEO of a digitech company recounted, this was a high risk strategy that 
had paid off, leading to rapid expansion:   
 
We raised approximately £15m through our recent IPO. Prior to listing we had no 
money. No private equity or bank debt finance. The banks had refused to lend money 
because we are a software developer and could not provide the bank with assets if the 
company had failed and gone bust. 
 
The life science company that had listed, just prior to the financial crisis, had done so quite 
speculatively during early to mid-stage R&D and far from reaching trading status. They aimed 
to raise the company’s profile and improve their chances of raising further funding through 
strategic collaboration with large pharmaceutical businesses (‘pharmas’). The respondent 
drew comparisons between early stage life science and exploratory mining and oil companies 
that list on AIM, highlighting that this is a high risk investment with a potentially high return. 
They stressed that the investment time horizon for life science businesses is lengthy (the 
company’s most advanced R&D had taken over ten years and was not yet at the market 
stage) and the importance of being able to maintain R&D momentum through ongoing 
additional funding, mentioning that the company had raised a further £10m from AIM since 
floating, as well as developing two key pharma collaborations:   
 
The AIM listing sought to raise the profile of our company with a view to raising money 
for R&D and netted £10m. The reason AIM was chosen was that it is a ‘wild west’ 
market, which offers the potential for raising money for uncertain businesses, like ours, 
which have not yet reached trading status. 
 
Only one company had floated on AIM to raise funds to buyout an existing investor. They also 
required later stage R&D funding and mentioned that the timing of the IPO was not ideal. A 
combination of investor pressured and lack of private equity had led to an earlier float than 
would have occurred, had more private equity been available: 
 
After a phase of concentrated R&D, the company floated on AIM. In hindsight this was 
too early as we did not raise the clear £6m that was required. The company was well 
received by the market, but it was not the best time to get a good market valuation. 
After various expenses and paying out a previous investor the float netted about £4m. 
This has not been enough to move as rapidly forward with R&D as we would have 
preferred. 
 
The one surveyed company that listed on AIM primarily to raise their profile, and not initially to 
raise funds, subsequently made a number of successful strategic acquisitions. Until recently 
raising £850,000, they had not required additional finance from AIM. Their status as a listed 
company was deemed beneficial for mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and the potential for 
raising finance from AIM for a large strategic acquisition in the future was perceived as an 
important option:  
 
The company sought admission to AIM in order to provide greater flexibility in funding 
further growth by enabling access to a wider range of investors. Our AIM listing has 
raised our company status within the industry and helped us recruit, retain and 
incentivise key employees. It has also considerably improved our status with customers 
and suppliers. Crucially for us, we have found that our listing status lends greater 
credibility to our acquisition activity, along with an increased ability to raise funds if 
required.   
 
Overall, the recent AIM listed TBSFs mainly sought and raised the levels of IPO development 
finance they required (ranging from £6-15m) and despite acknowledging that market 
conditions were tough, had reasonable expectations of raising further funds, mainly for 
acquisitions, in the near future (Table 2). They demonstrate that, whilst macro conditions and 
flotation timing were factors, the more decisive reasons related to the public market offering 
the best or only opportunity to raise sufficient growth capital, and managerial willingness to 
use and trust the structure of AIM. They typically exhibited knowledge, previous experience 
and preference for the AIM market, but include some earlier stage entries into public equity 
than the finance escalator predicts, due to lack of alternative and sufficient availability of risk 
finance. Two listed TBSFs had CEO founder ‘lifelong’ managers (Table 2), committed to their 
continuing management vision of growing UK owned and based businesses, where an IPO 
was deemed more suitable to achieve this than a trade sale. It is also notable that these 
businesses had not been dominated by private equity VCs and their appointed NEDs advising 
against IPOs.  
 
The potential IPOs 
 
The five potential IPOs are high growth TBSFs successfully backed by various forms of 
private equity including high net worth (HNW) individuals, business angel network syndicates, 
and private and corporate VC. Following the more conventional path of the finance escalator 
they have reached a stage where their main R&D activity is nearing completion and early 
market development is taking place. For many of their early stage investors the time is 
arriving, after between three to seven years investment, when they are seeking a return on 
their investment. At this stage these businesses are typically considering IPO or trade sale 
options (Revest and Sapio, 2012). As UK owned and based businesses, most would consider 
the UK AIM market as their ‘first and natural choice’ for an IPO. The exception was a 
business with predominantly US investors and markets which would consider NASDAQ, but 
would need to relocate to the US to effectively manage this. For UK TBSFs a key advantage 
of the UK AIM market, over other European and US stock markets, is that it is well known and 
understood by their directors. In most cases someone in the management team, notably their 
private equity NEDs (Table 2), will have had previous experience of a UK AIM IPO.   
The surveyed potential IPO managers were all aware that during the mid 2000s many 
growing TBSFs undertook IPOs. The strong AIM market at that time facilitated fundraising to 
buyout existing private investors. It also enabled raising further funds for business growth and 
strategic acquisitions, to broaden technology platforms, manufacture, increase sales and 
develop overseas markets. These observations support the contention that in buoyant market 
conditions AIM was able to attract some of the most successful independent TBSFs away 
from trade sale exits (Revest and Sapio 2012; Bessler and Seim 2012).  
Managers planning lifelong business development rather than with serial entrepreneur (9) 
traits (Table 2), aspired to retain and develop their business in the UK and were more likely to 
consider an IPO option, even in tough market conditions. They cited emulating Abcam Plc’s 
success; a life science business that listed on AIM in 2005, raising £15m to buyout existing 
private equity investors and invest in further R&D and market development into the US. The 
company remains an independent UK, Cambridge based, business with approaching £100m 
annual sales turnover and 650 staff.  
However, since the 2007 GFC, the surveyed potential IPO managers perceive there to be 
less appetite for TBSF investments on AIM and cite that the number of TBSF IPOs on the UK 
AIM market have declined rapidly. So whilst they demonstrate awareness of AIM’s 
advantages and in the right market conditions some, notably those with lifelong 
entrepreneurial aims, would prefer the IPO option, they appear to be deterred from this path. 
This finding underlines Revest and Sapio’s (2012) assertion that many of the best TBSFs 
prefer to exit private equity through trade sales, the indication being that these decisions are 
driven by VC preferences. Trade sales are generally preferred, particularly in poorer macro 
economic conditions, because they are simpler and currently the perceived amount of work 
and expense required for a successful IPO is too great for the expected returns. This supports 
Gompers (1996) suggestion that private equity VCs and their NEDs will only favour IPOs in 
more buoyant markets. The CEO of a life science business, who may be best described as a 
‘possible lifelong entrepreneur’ as they would ideally wish to retain a managerial role in a UK 
based business after IPO or trade sale, summarised this change in preference:      
During the mid 2000s the ideal model was to seek IPO within 7-10 years, but since the economic 
meltdown there doesn’t appear to be an appetite for IPOs on markets like AIM. The preferred 
option now is for a trade sale, as this appears more likely to raise the funds that current investors 
are looking for. This would involve selling most likely to a US business, but it is quite likely that 
the research arm in England would remain there. 
 
Only one manager indicated that an IPO was definitely their preferred option in the current 
economic climate (although this is a qualitative study, NESTA (2010) estimated that one in 
five private equity companies exit via IPOs). This CEO expressed a desire to commit to the 
business (a lifelong entrepreneur), with a clear strategy to remain UK owned and based. This 
company will seek IPO funds for acquisition expansion, rather than to buyout existing 
investors. They have been in consultations with AIM NOMADs and are well aware of the 
market requirements and the importance of timing, going to IPO in a strong position and 
avoiding market uncertainties. Whilst this company remains keen on an IPO, the indication is 
that this will take longer to reach and require more funding rounds than was originally 
envisaged, following the lengthening private investment horizon trend observed in several 
recent studies (NESTA 2010; CfEL 2013). 
 
We remain very keen to proceed to IPO within the next couple of years, but will not be rushed 
into this. We are aware that the AIM market has been tainted by poor quality ‘pump and dump’ 
companies (10) that have not proven to be good investments and are keen that AIM maintains 
high standards. We feel that our company will stand as a very solid high growth company and 
should do well, as bio market investments are performing relatively well in the current market. 
 
The general consensus among those surveyed is that a trade sale is simpler and easier to 
manage. Managers were appreciative, often based on previous experience, of the 
requirements for a successful IPO: 
 
IPOs can take half a year to prepare, requiring due diligence, developing a prospectus, and 
intensive work with market brokers, asset managers and financial PR companies to generate 
interest in the company. After the IPO there are intensive ongoing management requirements to 
work with market intermediaries in order to sustain interest in the business and maintain and 
increase the share price. 
 
The surveyed potential IPO companies want to avoid the risk that their existing private equity 
investors, who may be locked-in for an initial period after the IPO, do not receive the returns 
that they are seeking. Conversely, whilst the trade sale market is also difficult and there are 
signs that it is taking over a year longer to exit than originally planned (CfEL 2013), trade 
sales are typically a one off event and more likely to raise sufficient funds to meet current 
investors’ expectations. The surveyed managers do not believe that there is currently 
sufficient investor appetite in the UK AIM market to raise sufficient funds to merit the 
considerable effort required to undertake an AIM IPO. Notably, only one of these managers 
knew of a recent TBSF IPO on AIM, stating that this case had experienced fundraising 
problems with their flotation and was not a role model that they would want to follow.  
 
The CEO of the largest and fastest growing TBSF surveyed, with current sales turnover 
approaching £60m, indicated that AIM would not merit their attention as AIM’s volume of 
trading was low and it would be too much work to sustain market interest. This owner 
believed that they would be better waiting until they had larger capital status, in excess of 
£100m. At that stage they could consider listing on the full LSE market, which has greater 
liquidity. However, this CEO also expressed a current preference for private equity investors 
that they knew and could work well with and voiced several critical reasons why public listing 
might be problematic: ‘I don’t like the idea of going public with key business development 
information. Also, my time is better spent on managing the business, not managing investors’ 
expectations.’ 
 The overall trend exhibited by potential TBSF IPOs during the post GFC period has been to 
delay private equity exits by between one and three years and seek further interim rounds of 
private and corporate equity and joint venture finance, with a preference for trade sale exits 
unless there is a significant upturn in AIM market liquidity (Table 2). Knowledge and 
experience of AIM was considerable, notably through influential NEDs, but this could be 
positive and negative, as the managers had insight into the workload and risks involved in an 
IPO in adverse market conditions. In such conditions it is the businesses with greater 
capitalisation and ‘lifelong’ IDE (Moretti 2012) rather than serial entrepreneurs who are more 
likely to consider an IPO, with influential private equity NEDs favouring trade sales due to the 
overriding poor macro economic conditions depressing AIM (Gompers 1996).          
 
Structural Market Factors affecting AIM Companies 
 
None of the AIM listed businesses indicated any desire to delist, and cost was not an issue. 
However, concerns were expressed about market short-termism and the future potential for 
increasing levels of market reporting. Maintaining their AIM listing could be upwards of 
£150,000 per annum, when NOMAD, annual membership fees (£5,899), intermediary broker, 
analyst, financial public relations (PR), twice yearly reporting costs involving accountants and 
auditors, and required NED salaries were all considered. However, there was satisfaction that 
the markets were operating suitably and that their ‘advantages outweigh the burdens.’ 
Regular reporting was accepted as necessary for ‘transparency and investor confidence’ and 
although expensive, ‘the markets still offer good value for money.’  However, the general 
trend towards increasing levels of reporting will have unwelcome increasing time and cost 
burdens. One CEO exhibited Aggerwal and Hsu’s (2013) ‘dark side’ explanation for IPOs 
limiting innovation by reducing tolerance to failure (Manso 2011). They highlighted concerns 
that IPO market information requirements (AIM admission requires technical, strategy, market 
strengths and event timetabling documentation) and subsequent investor updates could 
assist competitors, particularly if R&D is slower than planned and allows competitors to catch 
up on their innovation. These businesses would not wish to see main LSE market style 
quarterly reporting replacing AIM’s current half yearly financial reporting. More regular 
reporting could increase market short term investment thinking and prove particularly 
problematic for early stage R&D companies, which would be most susceptible to a volatile 
short-term oriented market.  
 
Market short-termism 
 
The AIM listed TBSF cases were not adversely affected by market short-termism, although 
these managers noted that it was a potential problem requiring them to spend time with their 
analysts and larger institutional investors (e.g. half yearly roadshows with key investors) ‘…to 
ensure that they are on board with the company’s plans.’ Longer established, longer listed, 
businesses have greater stability from a core of longer term investors who have bought into 
the company strategy and ethos. However, for the younger, more recently listed businesses, 
there is far more volatility and uncertainty, particularly in relation to intensive R&D based 
TBSFs. Two CEOs voiced such concerns, underlining the long R&D lead time of life and bio 
science companies and the need for investors to take a longer term view in order for these 
businesses to succeed (Rowlands 2009; SQW 2009).       
 
There are pressures from investors, because the R&D phase has taken longer than would 
have been ideal. 
  
Too many investors are too short-termist, especially with respect to Pharma and Biotech 
companies on AIM, which are often in the development stage, and so have no immediate 
products to sell. Such investment often requires much longer investment time horizons.    
 
The role of NOMAD advisors 
 
The Kay Review (2012) found that AIM advisors (NOMADs) have an important role in the 
operation of AIM, but that their performance was ‘patchy’ and could be improved upon. 
Mason., Jones and Wells (2010) also remark on this key role and suggest that NOMADs 
could play a more enhanced hands-on role in supporting businesses. However, this is 
currently tempered by their neutral position in acting as a reporter to the market (BIS 2013). 
NOMAD advisors are a requirement of AIM and operate as a key link between the business 
and institutional investors, often operating as both broker and advisor.  
All of the AIM listed managers mentioned: ‘It is important to find a NOMAD that understands 
and promotes the business effectively”, particularly in relation to ‘working with analysts that 
understand the technical aspects of the business.’  All indicated that they had received a 
reasonable service, recognising that ‘you get what you pay for.’  NOMAD costs were upwards 
of £25,000 per annum, with more expensive advisors and brokers exhibiting better access to 
the more influential larger institutional investors. They are important gateways to investors, 
but there is a considerable requirement on the part of the business managers to produce the 
required due diligence and technical support information. The following CEO comments 
emphasise these points:    
We are aware that the quality of advisors is important to managing the company on the exchange. 
The job done by our advisor has been satisfactory, but not in terms of their broker promotional role. 
It is really important that our brokers promote the company and recently we added another broker 
in order to get more exposure and promotion in the market. 
We engaged our broker advisors for an initial private offer to the City and raised £4m. At this time it 
was felt that the brokers did a good job and the markets were very buoyant. They were also 
excellent as the gatekeeper in getting a good list of investors for the IPO. However, they are sales 
people - and very good at this - the company itself has to produce all the due diligence, technical 
and legal work with the help of other external professionals. This is of course very time consuming 
and expensive. Our advisor-broker fees and commissions have been around £1.25m in recent 
years.   
 
Overall, all five current AIM cases present a positive view of their experiences in entering and 
maintaining a listing. They clearly have issues and concerns around the quality of advisors 
and associated market services, the potential for increased bureaucracy and reporting 
requirements and the state of liquidity in the market. However, on balance none would 
currently consider leaving AIM, although it was tentatively mentioned in a couple of cases that 
this could change if more regular quarterly reporting were required, which would involve an 
increasing time and cost burden and also raise the threat of increased market short-termism. 
It should also be mentioned that the cost of delisting from AIM can be as expensive as listing. 
Whilst none of the surveyed AIM managers mentioned this, it could be considered as a 
barrier. The BIS (2013, p.41) report features an AIM delisting highlighting the volatility of the 
market, where a struggling company comes into the spotlight and faces increasing scrutiny 
and reporting, leading to spiralling costs and eventually enforcing a delisting: 
 
The business had to delist as it was unable to ride out the storm of failure to meet its rising debts. 
Once the market caught wind that it was in trouble, the business had to make a number of 
announcements. Each of the four announcements cost £25k, so within a short period of time it 
had cost £100k plus just to keep the market informed of the company’s attempts to keep afloat. 
Eventually it became too expensive to remain on the AIM exchange and the board and 
shareholders agreed that the best course of action would be to delist and sell ….  to pay off and 
transfer debts.    
 
Structural Market Factors Affecting Potential IPOs 
  
The potential TBSF IPO managers were well aware of the implications of UK stock exchange 
listing, several having previously undertaken UK AIM IPOs with other companies. Their main 
perceptions about listing centred on issues of management time input into the process and 
whether the cost burden justified this activity. There was widespread awareness that the 
average AIM flotation costs £250,000 and that this in no way accounts for all of the internal 
business management costs involved in this process (BIS 2013). This coupled with concerns 
about market short-termism represent the major structural deterrents to undertaking an IPO. It 
could take six months of management time to initiate an IPO, but in order to sustain and 
increase share value, it could require a further year of management time, working with 
advisors, brokers, analysts and financial PR companies to attract institutional investors, 
establish a strong position in the market and avoid any short term wobbles that could 
undermine them. There were concerns about balancing business and market management:  
 
‘Our analysis of the AIM market is that unless you have a really good initial deal flow, the share 
price is dictated by external trading and this requires a lot of work with analysts and investors over 
a sustained length of time – perhaps over a year. Therefore, the outcomes of an IPO are uncertain 
and market interpretation of business performance can be very different from the reality. Therefore 
we see that there are inherent risks with the public markets that mean that the timing and 
management of a flotation has to be just right.   
 
Short-term market responses to relatively young, early stage businesses were also a concern, 
suggesting that TBSFs should delay undertaking IPOs until they are more established with 
sufficient market capitalisation to instil investor confidence, or until the markets become more 
stable: 
 
An early stage business is fragile and open to loss of investor confidence if it doesn’t get 
contracts, or regulatory processes take longer to clear than expected. This leaves them open to 
short term losses, which are just too much of a risk in the current market.  
 
IPO timing is crucial, particularly in times of macro economic uncertainty. The average level of 
funds raised by AIM flotations (Table 1), generally supported by the experience of the five 
post GFC AIM cases, suggests that AIM can successfully provide TBSF growth finance 
(NESTA 2010). However, the windows of opportunity have to be seized and this may be 
perceived as a high risk strategy, at least until sufficient notable successes engender stronger 
market sentiment and liquidity (Ernst and Young 2012).     
The private equity cases are already reporting regularly to their investors and do not view 
AIM’s half yearly reporting as onerous. However, the level of public reporting information and 
potential for this to trigger market short-termism were deemed ‘stressful’. One CEO 
mentioned that they would prefer to ‘operate under the radar’, rather than reveal their 
activities to competitors, again supporting the ‘dark side’ private equity argument for 
innovative business growth (Aggerwal and Hsu 2013) .   
In terms of the costs and qualities of advisors (AIM NOMADS), there was widespread 
recognition that these are expensive, but necessary, and that you get what you pay for. One 
CEO, who had been in consultation with several NOMADs indicated that their quality could be 
variable and stressed the importance of sector knowledge: 
Our discussions with asset management companies have led to some very strong AIM NOMADs 
coming forward. However, we have come across others who were more like ‘City jockeys’ with no 
great sector experience or interest and this wouldn’t work for us. We are prepared to pay highly, up 
to £300,000 per annum, for the best service we can get.   
 
AIM’s current ‘light touch’ operating and reporting structure appears generally acceptable to 
both potential and current listed TBSFs. Key concerns relate to potential increased reporting 
requirements fuelling short-termism and balancing investor and competitor information. Whilst 
listed TBSFs believe the market offers value for money and have been able to successfully 
raise funds, a far greater concern for potential IPOs is the cost and uncertainty of listing, 
which a demonstrably more buoyant AIM market might overcome.      
 
Synthesising the Key Findings - The Decision Factors Matrix 
The paper presents five TBSF business cases where AIM IPOs during and since the GFC 
have demonstrably proven to be a viable funding option for TBSFs. It also presents evidence 
from five contrasting TBSF business cases that have reached a stage in their development 
cycle where they are preparing for private equity exit and are considering the IPO option. 
In exploring the underlying motivational context to the pecking order attraction and selection 
of IPOs for both the existing AIM companies and the potential IPO companies the case study 
research revealed considerable variation. The degree of attraction was found to depend to 
greater or lesser degrees upon management motivational aims and strategies to financing 
business growth, perceptions of AIM’s structure and costs, the position of the business in its 
development cycle and its ability to raise alternative sources of finance within the prevailing 
macro economic conditions.         
(Insert Table 4) 
 
To synthesise the research findings a ‘decision factors matrix’ is utilised which identifies the 
cross-relating strands of findings. This seeks to provide clearer understanding, for each case, 
of the extent to which management resource base factors compared to macro economic 
conditions affecting the market and the availability of alternative finance, and structural 
matters relating to the AIM market have influenced the motivation and pecking order decision 
to list, remain listed, or seek alternative sources of finance. 
The recent TBSF IPOs surveyed were motivated primarily for later stage R&D and market 
development with emphasis on strategic acquisitions to complement their technology platform 
development, or facilitate market entry or development, notably overseas. This is in-line with 
the growth financing phases of the finance escalator model (Gill 2010; Mason, Jones and 
Wells 2010). However, some businesses were in earlier stage R&D phases where alternative 
debt and equity finance has not been available and AIM has been perceived as a worthwhile 
risk which has paid off, despite high entry costs. This variation from the finance escalator, 
where IPOs typically occur towards the end of the R&D cycle, may be seen as a direct 
consequence of the breakdown in this model (Gill 2010; Mason, Jones and Wells. 2010). It 
was not evident (Table 5) that the listed businesses would have found suitable alternative 
finance, particularly for the scale of acquisitions planned, but there was some evidence that 
AIM’s fund raising conditions after 2007 had caused delays to an IPO and further fundraising, 
highlighting the uncertainties of the market and importance of timing for investments (Ernst 
and Young 2012).  
Whether pulled into the market by the lure of funding at levels far beyond what is available 
from alternative sources, or pushed into the market by existing investors seeking a return, 
these ‘IDE’ managers (Moretti 2012) are united by a strategic management mindset to grow 
independently, rather than accept a trade sale option. This desire appears strongest amongst 
‘lifelong’ entrepreneurs with a longer term motivational vision to keep managing a UK owned 
business. As such, despite the high costs of maintaining a listing, they state that ‘the benefits 
outweigh the costs’ and plan to continue to grow using the AIM market, believing that they 
can raise further funds on AIM, even in the prevailing tough conditions. They are aware of 
potential structural issues with AIM, but have been able to manage investors’ expectations 
and have not experienced undue short term market pressures, unanimously indicating that 
current reporting requirements are suitable, but suggesting in a minority of cases that 
increased levels of reporting, alongside increased costs and market short-termism (which was 
more acutely felt by the longer investment horizon life science companies) could be 
detrimental and potentially lead to consideration for delisting.   
In contrast most (4/5) potential TBSF IPOs surveyed are unlikely to choose an IPO option 
over a trade sale in the current economic climate (Table 5). Whilst there were structural 
concerns around market reporting requirements undermining competitiveness and potentially 
fuelling short term market volatility, the fundamental reason for not undertaking an IPO is 
financial, relating to poor market conditions. These managers, notably where there are 
influential VCs and NEDs with previous AIM experience, do not believe AIM is currently liquid 
enough for IPOs to raise sufficient funds. They view entry costs and management time as 
prohibitive and perceive too greater risk that they will not meet current private investors’ exit 
valuations after the lock-in period post IPO. A trade sale, which is perceived as a more 
straight forward one-off event, is therefore currently their preferred safer and more certain 
option.  
However, a key finding is that the ‘lifelong’ entrepreneurs exhibited greater willingness to 
consider an IPO, particularly if AIM becomes more buoyant over the next year or two. They 
recognise that ‘timing is critical’ and that ‘the larger the market capitalisation of the business 
the greater the chances of success’ as this will instil greater investor confidence.  
Importantly, this analysis revealed some tensions between the aims of lifelong entrepreneurs 
and private equity VCs and their NEDs (Table 5, cases I and J). In these two cases VC 
investors are strongly influenced by current market conditions in seeking US trade sales in 
order to secure optimum exit value and investment return for the company. Their shorter term 
goals are in conflict with the CEO’s longer term aims to remain as managers of UK-based 
companies and the pragmatic approach of these CEOs leads to their categorisation as 
‘potential lifelong’ entrepreneurs. These CEOs suggest that if the IPO market improves they 
would consider this form of exit and make a stronger case for it with their investors, as it is 
more suited to their entrepreneurial vision for the growth of the company.         
The complete lack of evidence of any push from private equity VCs for IPOs supports 
Gompers’ (1996) grandstanding theory that this option will only be favoured in more buoyant 
market conditions. Overall, a major outcome of the poor market exit conditions for these 
TBSFs is a lengthening of their exit timetables incorporating further rounds of private equity, 
including some corporate, trade (e.g. early stage pharmaceutical investment, Cave 2009) and 
joint venture finance, but also potentially locking-in of private equity which could otherwise 
recycle to earlier stage TBSFs (NESTA 2009; Mason, Jones and Wells 2010).   
 
Summary Conclusions and Implications 
In conclusion, this small in-depth case study approach has revealed that market conditions, 
rather than the managerial resource base, are most influential in the pecking order 
preferences of TBSFs in relation to their perceptions of IPOs. This is manifested by pull 
factors towards alternative financing sources which appear less risky, but also push factors 
into undertaking IPOs earlier in the business cycle than expected, due to a lack of alternative 
financing options. The study found that AIM listed companies do harbour some reservations 
about AIM’s structure, but these are mainly confined to possible future changes. Primarily, 
more regular reporting requirements could increase cost burdens and fuel market short-
termism. However, AIM’s current ‘light touch’ regulation and relatively low maintenance costs 
are not major concerns. These companies believe that they can effectively raise funds on AIM 
and none are currently considering delisting. For prospective TBSF IPOs the primary concern 
is the poor liquidity performance of the AIM market. Whilst they consider that investor 
confidence in AIM remains low, the costs of undertaking an IPO appear prohibitive and trade 
sale options appear to offer more optimal exit value to both the CEOs and their investors.    
However, a key finding of the study from a managerial RBV is the distinction between ‘serial’ 
and ‘lifelong’ IDE managers and the interplay between them and their VCs and NEDs in the 
pecking order selection of IPOs. The study clearly shows frictions between the longer term 
motivations for retained ownership pertaining to lifelong entrepreneurs and the shorter term 
motivations of private equity investors who are seeking optimum exit value. In this respect 
lifelong entrepreneurs express a preference for IPOs as a means of maintaining a controlling 
management presence in the business in order to achieve their longer term business vision, 
whilst trade sales currently suit the market driven shorter term aspirations of VCs and private 
investors (Gompers 1996). This finding builds on the theoretical work of Moretti (2012) and  
Aulet and Murray (2013) in developing a more nuanced view of IDE managers and also on 
the VC negotiation strengths literature (Hellman 2006; Cumming 2008). The evidence 
provided here suggests that only the strongest conviction lifelong entrepreneurs are likely to 
hold sway over their private investors in selecting an IPO in relatively poor market conditions, 
whilst improving market conditions would lead to greater private investor and VC support for 
IPOs (Gompers 1996; Revest and Sapio 2012; Bessler and Seim 2012). This is a potentially 
important finding, worthy of further research, as it suggests at the very least that with 
improved market conditions more UK TBSFs could choose AIM IPO exits and remain as UK 
based high growth companies.      
Overall, these findings suggest that AIM has supported the growth and retention of UK TBSFs 
which may become significant future UK growth businesses. However, until AIM becomes 
more buoyant and attractive to lower cap TBSFs few are likely to choose an IPO over a trade 
sale, unless there is no alternative. The consequences of the recent dire TBSF exit market 
have resulted in locking-in of private equity, access to finance problems down the chain and 
barriers to business growth. A vibrant AIM could help alleviate this problem, with the majority 
of listed and potential listing TBSFs, along with key market analysts and reports (Kay 2012; 
Ernst and Young 2012; BIS 2013) suggesting that greater attraction to investors to provide a 
more liquid and stable long term investment market is the key.          
End Notes 
 
(1) UKSMEF 2012 suggests 3%. 
(2) Adopted from Sir George Cox’s Small Business Review (2013) and allowance of AIM 
shares for ISAs. 
(3) The selected businesses are not ‘matched pairs’ and being pre and post IPO are, by 
necessity, at different stages of development. 
(4) Digital Electronic/IT sectors (SIC2003): 3001/2 Office and Computers; 3110 Electrical 
motors; 3120 Electrical controls; 3210 Electrical components; 3220 TV and Radio; 3320 
Measuring devices; 3330 Process controls; 3340 Optical; 3530 Aircraft; 6420 Telecomms; 
7210 Hardware consultancy; 7221/2 Publishing software; 7230/40 Data; 7260 Other 
computing  Bio/Life science sectors (SIC2003): 2416/7 Plastics; 2441/2 Pharmaceuticals; 
3310 Medical; 7310/20 R&D consultancy. 
(5) The recent GFK (2013) report on London’s Tech City suggests a recent rapid growth of 
TBSFs with as many as 1,350 in this part of London alone. 
(6) Collectively these studies contained 50 UK TBSFs that had sought equity growth finance 
since 2007. 
(7)  During the period 2007-2012 the annual average number of UK TBSF IPOs on AIM has 
been 15. The range of private equity TBSFs seeking IPO in any given year is reported at 
between 3% (CfEL 2013) and 20% (Revest and Sapio 2012; NESTA 2010), rising with 
improved market buoyancy. Taking a median of 11.5% (which is in-line with recent reporting 
from UK government VC schemes, Baldock 2014), the annual number considering an exit 
would be 130, but the prevailing poor market conditions in this period suggest that fewer 
would be actively considering exit, whilst in a more buoyant market this could rise to in excess 
of 200 per annum.   
(8) Either the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Financial Director (FD). 
(9) Serial entrepreneurs start or develop businesses to a point of sale and then move on to 
managing other businesses. 
(10) Businesses receiving private equity investment and then being placed on the AIM market 
to realise investor returns, but which do not have longer term value or sustainability. 
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Table 1: AIM Listings and Delistings and New Funds Raised, 1995 to 2012 
 
 Companies IPO Funds Raised (£m) 
Year UK Foreign Total New Delists Change Total  Average 
1995 118 3 121 123 2 121 71.2 0.58 
1996 235 17 252 145 14 131 521.3 3.59 
1997 286 22 308 107 51 56 341.5 3.19 
1998 291 21 312 75 71 4 267.5 3.57 
1999 325 22 347 102 67 35 333.7 3.27 
2000 493 31 524 277 100 177 1754.1 6.33 
2001 587 42 629 177 72 105 593.1 3.35 
2002 654 50 704 160 85 75 490.1 3.06 
2003 694 60 754 162 112 50 1095.4 6.76 
2004 905 116 1021 355 88 267 2775.9 7.82 
2005 1179 220 1399 519 141 378 6461.2 12.44 
2006 1330 304 1634 462 227 235 9943.8 21.52 
2007 1347 347 1694 284 224 60 6581.1 23.17 
2008 1233 317 1550 114 258 -144 1107.8 9.71 
2009 1052 241 1293 36 293 -257 740.4 20.57 
2010 967 228 1195 102 200 -98 1219.4 11.95 
2011 918 225 1143 90 142 -52 608.8 6.76 
2012 870 226 1096 71 118 -47 707.1 9.96 
Source: Adapted from AIM Monthly Report, February 2013  
 UK/Foreign/Total columns represent net aggregate year end total figures  
i.e. after annual Delists are subtracted from New/IPO listings   
 
Table 2: Profile of Surveyed AIM and Potential IPO TBSFs 
AIM Listed  
Description 
Trading 
(years) 
Staff Sales 
Turnover 
Markets/ 
Exports 
Growth Strategy in 
next two years Founder
/ owners 
share 
Board 
No. NEDs 
Other 
board 
posts  
Visions for future 
growth financing 
Views on IPOs 
and further public 
market 
fundraising    CEO status 
A Digital 
imaging – for 
industrial 
health and 
science 
sectors  
5 50 £7.2m 85% exports, 
growth in 
China and 
India 
Mainly organic, possible 
strategic acquisitions, 
little growth  
None 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
Yes 
NEDs 
 
 
Listed to raise 
profile for M&As, 
small-scale 
fundraising recently 
£850k, AIM market 
tough. 
 
May raise funds if 
market improves 
and acquisition 
opportunity 
 
n/a 
 
 
 
B Microchip 
scientific 
instruments – 
measuring 
devices for life 
sciences 
11 30 £1m 90%+ exports, 
developing 
OEM sales 
agreements 
Rapid OEM sales 
growth to £10m+ and 
50+ staff  
5% 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
NEDs 
 
 
 
Delayed IPO 1 year 
until market able to 
raise £6m - partly 
to buyout investor - 
raised further 
£1.5m, may raise 
further market 
development funds 
in next year  
IPO moderately 
successful, tough 
AIM market 
 
 
 
Life  
 
 
 
 
C Software 
development 
– for transport 
sector 
9 50 £8.7m Mainly UK 
based, <5% 
exports  
Recent rapid growth, 
now organic with 
possible acquisitions  
4% 
 
 
5 
 
 
3 
 
 
Yes 
NEDs 
 
IPO successful, no 
problems raising 
funds on AIM  
 
May raise further 
funds on AIM if find 
suitable 
acquisitions 
Life 
 
 
D 
Collaborative 
software – for 
the software 
development 
sector  
7 100 £2.9m 100% exports, 
mainly to US 
Stable sales with 
increased R&D staff 
40% 
 
 
 4 2 Yes 
Successful IPO of 
£15m - only way to 
raise funds, no 
prior equity 
 
 
No plans to raise 
further funds as 
self funding growth 
 
 
Serial 
 
 
 
E Life 
sciences – 
gene therapy 
0  
(est. 18 
yrs) 
30 Not trading, 
£30m cap 
Has US and 
EU R&D 
partners 
Restructuring, R&D, 
nearing marketisation  
None 
 
 
5 
 
 
3 
 
 
Yes 
NEDs 
 
IPO raised £10m 
for R&D, raised 
£10m in 2012, may 
raise further funds 
in 2014  
Harder to raise 
funds on AIM since 
listed 
 
n/a 
 
 
Potential 
IPOs 
     
       
F Digital 
software – 
complete 
solutions for 
green energy 
sector 
2 76 £20m UK domestic 
and 
commercial 
trade 
Sales growth over 
£100m, employment   
100+ and new 
ownership investment 
20% 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
PE 
NEDs 
 
  
Low cap IPO 
market illiquid, 
delay exit with 
major PE round 
 
 
Will trade sale to 
major player in 5 
years 
 
 
Serial 
 
 
 
G Life 
sciences – 
genetic 
treatment 
testing 
techniques for 
pharmas 
5 100 £9m 90% exports 
and rising 
Exponential sales 
growth to £30m+, 115+ 
staff, seeking IPO  
40% 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
PE 
NEDs 
 
  
Willing to extend 
PE rounds, 1-2 
years but will IPO 
 
 
IPO to retain UK 
company and 
enhance growth 
 
 
Life 
 
 
 
H Life 
sciences joint 
venture - new 
injection 
systems 
4 18 £10m 100% export, 
mainly US and 
EU pharmas 
Doubling of sales to 
£20m, 30+ staff, market 
new products 33% 
 
 
8 
 
 
2 
 
 
NEDs 
 
  
IPO market poor, 
extend exit 2-3 
years with JV and 
PE funds 
 
Consider IPO, but 
trade sale to 
Pharma most likely 
to get investors 
guaranteed return 
Serial 
 
 
I  Instrument 
engineering – 
nanotech 
measuring 
devices 
8 50 £5m 75% export, 
increasing, 
mainly to US 
Sales rise to £20m+, 
100+ staff, more PE 
funds for growth 15% 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
PE 
NED 
 
 
IPO market poor, 
extend exit 2-3 
years with further 
PE/Corp equity 
 
 
IPO or TS - TS 
more likely to US, 
preferred by 
investors 
 
 
Possible 
Life 
 
 
J Life 
sciences – 
fertility 
treatments 
3 50 £1m 50% exports 
rising to 80%, 
mainly in US 
Sales rise to £20m+, 
75+ staff, US sales 
office  
50% 
 
 
7 
 
 
4 +2 Obs 
 
 
PE 
NED 
 
IPO market tough, 
extend 2-3 years 
with PE round 
 
IPO or TS - most 
likely US TS, more 
reliable, easier to 
manage 
Possible 
Life 
 
Note: Cases have been anonymised to protect businesses’ competitiveness and avoid insider information’ issues 
Abbreviations: PE = private equity; NED = non executive director; Serial = serial entrepreneur; Life = lifelong IDE entrepreneur with the same business; TS = 
trade sale; Obs = board observers 
Table 3: Growth Performance and Forecast for Surveyed AIM and Potential IPO TBSFs 
 
Median Potential IPO (n=5) AIM Listed (n=5) 
Sales Turnover 2010-11 £2.4m £3.9m* 
Sales Turnover 2011-12 £9m £6m* 
Sales Turnover 2012-13 £20m £8.7m* 
Total Staff 2011 45 30 
Total Staff 2012 50 50 
Total Staff 2013 100 50 
Total Asset Value 2010-11 £10m £3m 
Total Asset Value 2011-12 £12m £13.8m 
Total Asset Value 2012-13 £25m £15m 
Note:  *Based on four trading cases 
 Data based on company year end which may vary by up to 12 months   
 
Table 4: IPO Decision Factors Matrix 
 
   Economic  Structural  Managerial 
AIM Listed  IPO status/ 
likelihood 
Macro 
conditions 
Alternative 
Finance Costs 
Short-
term Report CEO 
NED 
influence 
A Digital 
imaging  Y N n/a N N N n/a* d/k 
C Software 
development  Y N N N N N Life N 
D Software 
development   Y N N P N N Serial N 
B Scientific 
instruments   Y P - delay  N P P P Life  YY 
E Life 
sciences  Y N N N P P n/a* d/k 
Potential 
IPOs         
G Life 
sciences 
IPO very 
likely P - delay 
Private 
Equity N N N Life N 
I  Instrument 
engineering  
US Trade 
Sale YY - delay 
Private 
Equity Y Y Y 
Possible 
Life YN 
J Life 
sciences  
US Trade 
Sale YY - delay 
Corporate 
Equity P N P 
Possible 
Life YN 
F Energy 
software Trade Sale YP 
Private 
Equity Y P P Serial N 
H Life 
sciences  Trade Sale YP JV/Pharma Y Y P Serial YN 
Key:  Y=yes; P=perhaps; N=no; YY=yes positive; YP=yes perhaps; YN=yes negative 
* Interviewed CEO not involved in founding/early stage      
Cases listed in order of strength of support and experience with AIM: lightest shade= highly successful 
IPO; second lightest shade=quite successful IPO; third lightest shade=IPO very likely; fourth lightest 
shade=IPO more likely if market up-turn; darkest shade=IPO possible, but unlikely even in market up-
turn. 
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